Reversing a Jury Verdict on Appeal

Getting a jury verdict reversed on appeal is an uphill battle. After all, a jury verdict means that an entire panel of (presumably) unbiased and disinterested citizens has heard the witnesses’ testimony, examined all other evidence, deliberated on the case, and rendered the judgment that the group thought best. It also means that a (hopefully) well-trained trial judge has supervised the trial in an effort to ensure that the law was applied correctly and that only appropriate evidence and arguments were introduced. Appeals courts are generally hesitant to second-guess these decision-makers who heard and adjudicated the case first-hand. What is more, this hesitancy isn’t just a personality trait of individual appellate judges, it is often written into the law in the form of deferential standards of review that require, for example, that a court of appeals not overturn a trial-court decision unless there was an “abuse of discretion” in the trial court or unless there was no — or virtually no — evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

And these are only some of the more common, more obvious reasons why it’s so difficult to get a jury verdict reversed. Entire studies, like this one, are dedicated to the issue, and there are dozens more reasons why jury verdicts have such staying power. Overarching statistics are hard to come by, but one study suggests that civil plaintiffs who lose a jury trial are successful on appeal only 13% of the time. Civil defendants fare better, but even then, the odds are hardly encouraging: According to the same study, civil defendants succeed in obtaining a court-of-appeals reversal in 31% of cases — still less than 1-in-3 odds. Results are just as gloomy, or more so, for defendants appealing guilty verdicts in criminal cases.

On the other hand, these statistics also show that convincing an appellate court to reverse a jury verdict is possible, provided you have sound legal arguments and that those arguments are cogently and persuasively presented. This was the formula that led to our recent success in getting the jury verdict in In re Hutchings Family Trust reversed. Here’s a brief excerpt, from the “Summary of Argument” section of our opening brief, to give you a flavor for the strength of the arguments we made there (you can find a synopsis of the case, and also peruse our complete briefs and the appellate court’s decision, here):

The trial court made several fundamental errors that . . . can only be remedied by reversal.  Ohio law states that a conversion claimant must prove ownership of, or right to possess, the property at issue at the time of the alleged conversion.  But it is a legal certainty that plaintiff didn’t own or have a right to possess his parent’s property when the supposed conversion—which took place, if at all, when the trust was executed—occurred.  Ohio law likewise says that the property in a conversion case must consist solely of tangible personal property, but that is also not the case here.  In short, a conversion claim doesn’t square with the facts of this case. 

Second, the trial court made thoroughgoing errors regarding both the burden and standard of proof applicable to plaintiff’s “conversion” claim. . . . [T]he law required plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that John exerted undue influence over his father.  Instead the trial court doubly erred by directing the jury to apply a greater-weight-of-the-evidence standard to the overarching question of whether John acted “appropriately” and by placing the burden of proof on John.

Third, the Ohio Supreme Court and the Revised Code both require proof of the malice necessary to award punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.  But the trial court applied the greater-weight-of-the-evidence standard instead.  The facts here were insufficient to prove malice by clear and convincing evidence (or even by the greater weight of the evidence).

Finally, even if none of the above were true, the trial court’s judgment should still be reversed because, even by the trial court’s own standards, the judgment in plaintiff’s favor was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and barred by the in terrorem clause.